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Abstract  
Sports studies is currently dominated by the intellectualist approach to understanding 
skill and expertise, meaning that questions about the phenomenological nature of 
skilled performance in sport have generally been overshadowed by the emphasis on 
the cognitive. By contrast, this article responds to calls for a phenomenology of 
sporting embodiment by opening up a philosophical exploration of the nature of 
athletic being-in-the-world. In particular, the paper explores the conceptualisation of 
immanence and transcendence in relation to the embodied practice of dance, engaging 
with Merleau-Ponty’s important insight that the body can be a source of 
transcendence. I also draw on data from in-depth qualitative interviews with 
professional contemporary dancers to explore dancers’ concepts of ‘being in your 
body’ and ‘being in the moment’, and to suggest that during the actual embodied 
practice of dance, dancers do not experience transcendence and immanence as they 
are conceptualised in philosophy. Rather, I argue, dancers experience a third mode of 
being that is somehow in-between these two binary terms. I have called this ‘inhabited 
transcendence’. 
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Introduction 
 
Sports studies is currently dominated by the intellectualist approach to understanding 
skill and expertise exemplified by the information processing model. This means that 
questions about the phenomenological nature of skilled performance in sport have 
generally been overshadowed by the emphasis on the cognitive, coming, in particular, 
from sports psychology, but also from the dominance of philosophy of mind within 
sports philosophy and beyond (Breivik 2007). In contrast to this trend, this paper 
responds to calls for a phenomenology of sporting embodiment by opening up a 
philosophical exploration of the nature of athletic being-in-the-world (Kerry and 
Armour 2000; Allen-Collinson 2009; Hockey and Allen-Collinson 2007; Hogeveen 
2011; Moe 2004; Hardes and Hogeveen 2016).  
 
Drawing on the work of phenomenologists Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, Dreyfus 
has offered what is generally considered the fullest phenomenological model of skill 
acquisition and skilled performance (see, for example, Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1986). 
The information processing model (originating in the work of Fitts and Posner 1967) 
locates skill entirely in the cognitive realm suggesting that our minds operate as 
computers processing information from the environment through a series of learnt 
rules. As we move through the learning process to develop expertise in the skill, the 
rules we follow become more complex and refined, leading to enhanced performance, 
and our processing of external stimuli happens at an increasingly unconscious level. 
In contrast to the information processing model, Dreyfus (2002; Dreyfus and Dreyfus 
1986) suggests that while learners acquiring a skill will be reliant on following rules, 
once the stage of expertise has been reached, the learner is able to operate intuitively 
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in a state of ‘absorbed coping’ without any need to process information at the 
cognitive level (whether this be conscious or unconscious). 
 
Recent work on skill in the philosophy of sport has supported the applicability of 
Dreyfus’ model for understanding embodied skill in the context of high level sports 
practice (Moe 2004, 2005). The emphasis on the automatic nature of expert 
movement in this account has, however, been criticised by Breivik (2007, 2013) as 
mirroring the information processing model in its denial of a role for consciousness at 
this level, thus reducing expert practice to zombie-like behaviour. Breivik (2013) 
further notes that the focus on ‘being in the zone’, ‘peak experience’ and ‘flow’ in 
sports psychology has distorted our understanding of elite performance by ignoring a 
role for consciousness. In contrast to this, Breivik (2013) emphasises that 
sportspeople often report a heightened state of consciousness or awareness. He 
therefore argues that Dreyfus’ model of skill acquisition and his concept of absorbed 
coping is unsatisfactory for pinpointing the role of consciousness in elite performance 
(see also Breivik 2007; Bailey and Pickard 2010; Eriksen 2010; Hogeveen 2011; 
Larsen 2016). 
 
The aim of the current article is not to further enter into debates about consciousness 
predicated on a particular theory of mind, but rather to shed light on some of the 
underpinning issues at the ontological level through a return to some of the 
foundational phenomenology. As such it engages with the work of Merleau-Ponty 
with a particular focus on how notions of transcendence and immanence can be 
utilised and developed to help us understand awareness during skilled embodied 
practice. The paper explores the lived experience of individuals engaged in the expert 
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performance of physical skills through a particular focus on professional dancers 
trained and working within the tradition of contemporary dance. The article draws on 
empirical data
i
 for its ability to generate accounts of the lived experience of athletic 
embodiment – such as the experiential categories of ‘being in the moment’ and ‘being 
in your body’ – which can be fruitfully explored in relation of Merleau-Ponty’s non-
dualist phenomenological philosophy.  
 
In place of the traditional dichotomy between mind and body – subject and object – 
through Merleau-Ponty’s (2002) philosophy we can begin to think about embodied 
being in terms of the concept of the ‘body-subject’ (Crossley 2005, 11; Williams and 
Bendelow 1998, 6). This is a notion of embodied being that is poised in-between the 
traditional binary terms, having irreducible elements of both traditional Cartesian 
subjectivity and traditional Cartesian objectivity. Most significantly for the current 
study, and as will be elaborated later, Merleau-Ponty’s non-dualist understanding of 
embodied being also has radical implications for the conceptualisation of 
transcendence and immanence (Young 1998; Weiss 1999, 46).  
 
This paper is, however, concerned not only with the non-dualist theorising of 
transcendence and immanence as modes of embodied being, but also with attending to 
the lived experience of athletic embodiment through an engagement with 
transcendence and immanence as they are actually experienced by the dancing body-
subject during the embodied practice of dance. Indeed I contend that if we are to truly 
move away from dualism in our understanding of human being, we need not only to 
conceptualise embodied being adequately in philosophical terms, but also to engage 
with lived embodied practice. The article therefore considers dancers’ accounts of 
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their relationships with images of their own dancing bodies in relation to notions of 
interrupted or inhibited transcendence, and also explores two concepts which the 
dancers used, those of ‘being in your body’ and ‘being in the moment’ in relation to a 
new non-dualist concept I have termed inhabited transcendence.  
 6 
Objectification: Interrupted or Inhibited Transcendence 
 
Transcendence and Immanence 
Existentialist phenomenologists such as Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and 
Simone de Beauvoir identify different modes or dimensions of human being or 
existence including that of being-for-itself and that of being-for-others. It is in relation 
to these modes of existence that the dual terms of transcendence and immanence are 
defined in the work of these philosophers, where transcendence is understood to be 
characterised by the freedom and the orientation or openness towards the future of the 
being-for-itself, and immanence is understood to be characterised by the sense of 
rootedness to the past of the objectified being-for-others.  
 
For Sartre (2003) and in particular de Beauvoir (1997), this transcendence/immanence 
distinction is closely tied to the mind/body distinction where the mind is held to be 
our primary source of transcendence and the body to be our primary source of 
immanence or being-for-others. Under this framework, and especially in the work of 
de Beauvoir (1997), the body is in the negative position of holding us back and 
imprisoning us in materiality, objecthood and being-for-others, while the mind has the 
privileged position of affording us transcendence: freedom and self-determination.  
 
In consideration of the traditional male/female, culture/nature, mind/body binaries, de 
Beauvoir (1997) also highlights that it is woman in our society who is mainly 
associated with the body and thus with immanence, meaning that she is typically 
denied the transcendence afforded to men. Immanence and the objectification of 
being-for-others can therefore be seen not to be purely contingent on the individual 
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subject experiencing the look of the Other at a certain point in time. Rather it is 
related to the ways in which experience of self is mediated by a particular social 
context, as Young (1998) explores in her phenomenological analysis of women’s 
experience – in the broad social context of patriarchal society – of inhibiting self-
consciousness
ii
 when engaged in physical activities. One can experience oneself as a 
being-for-others and thus experience immanence even when one is unwatched or 
alone. 
 
In contrast to Sartre and de Beauvoir, Merleau-Ponty (2002) suggests in 
Phenomenology of Perception, that the body can in fact be a primary source of 
transcendence rather than immanence. For Merleau-Ponty, the body (or rather the 
body-subject) has its own form of intentionality – motor-intentionality – which entails 
a direct (pre-reflective) embodied understanding of and orientation towards the world 
beyond the individual. This bodily understanding is defined as an experience of 
practical competence characterised by ‘the harmony between what we aim at and 
what is given, between the intention and the performance’ and it ‘has its abode neither 
in thought nor in the objective body, but in the body as mediator of a world’ 
(Merleau-Ponty 2002, 167). The body(-subject) thus has qualities that might be more 
traditionally associated with the Cartesian mind or subject, and thus with freedom as a 
being-for-itself.  
 
He does also concede, however, that the body may be a source of immanence under 
certain circumstances. Following Heidegger’s (1996) conceptualisation of equipment 
and the ready-at-hand, Merleau-Ponty (2002) considers the important distinction to be 
in relation to whether the embodied agent’s focus is on the task they are performing –
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on the intention of the action, such as to drive a nail into the wall – or on the body 
itself – the hand wielding the hammer. For Heidegger, when the focus is on the task, 
the skilled practitioner is absorbed into the immediate environment – this is why 
Dreyfus uses of the term ‘absorbed coping’ to describe proficient or skilled behaviour 
– and experiences him or herself as a being-for-itself acting on the world. Likewise 
for Merleau-Ponty when we are task-focussed and our engagement with the world is 
characterised by pre-reflective motor-intentionality, the body can be a source of 
transcendence. This transcendence is, however, interrupted by immanence when we 
focus on our bodies as this focus renders the body an object to us and our experience 
of self is reduced to a being-for-others.  
 
Making Shapes 
This distinction between the body as a source of transcendence during task-focused 
action and the body as a source of immanence when we focus on and objectify it can 
help us understand dancers’ experiences of how the objectification of the body in the 
mirror image distracts from or interrupts the uninhibited flow of the dancer’s 
movement. Indeed over-reliance on the mirror (or photographic) image of the dancing 
body was understood by the dancers to focus too much attention on ‘making shapes’ 
and on the objective positioning of the body in space: 
  
I think if you think too much about what things look like from the outside 
you start making shapes. [Rhianna]  
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This, in turn was experienced as alienating in that it distanced the dancer from direct 
engagement with their dance practice and also potentially disrupted the ability of the 
dancer to adequately invest in and perform the choreography for an audience:  
 
It sort of takes away the realness if you’re looking at just like positions 
and shapes – then when you’re actually dancing it can also just look like 
you’re doing a shape or position. [Christina]  
 
This sense of the paucity of images which render the dancing body an object 
positioned in space is also captured by Sheets-Johnstone (2009) in her work on 
kinaesthetic awareness and memory in dance. For Sheets-Johnstone the dancer’s 
awareness of movement cannot be reduced to  
 
‘awareness of changed positions … [as] while the perception of movement 
certainly includes positional awareness, it is quintessentially a dynamic 
awareness’ (2009, 270, emphasis in original).  
 
Thus photographic images were also problematic as they rendered dancing bodies 
mere shapes or patterns in external objective space rather than capturing the 
subjective experience of dance, which was felt to be internal to the living, moving, 
communicating body-subject: 
  
You can maybe look at a photograph of you doing it, but you can’t, it’s 
about movement, you’re not going to be standing like a photograph, I 
mean you might do but it’s part of a movement, it’s part of a thing that’s 
going on: it’s live. [Louisa] 
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The distinction here, in Merleau-Pontian terms, is between the body as object and the 
experience of the lived-body or body-subject acting on the world through motor 
intentionality: 
 
When I put my hand to my knee, I experience at every stage of the movement the 
fulfilment of an intention which was not directed at my knee as an idea or even 
as an object, but as a present and real part of my living body, that is, finally, as a 
stage in my perpetual movement towards a world. (Merleau-Ponty 2002, 167) 
 
 
Acquiring and experiencing skill 
This sense of experiencing the body as part of your own subjective presence to the 
world rather than as an object (shape) in the world was described by a number of the 
dancers with the phrase ‘being in your body’. ‘Being in your body is, however, a 
mode of experience that characterises expertise with a movement sequence and is thus 
not necessarily present in the early stages of the learning process:  
 
There might be a point when you first learn a piece when you’re not in 
your body because it takes time to let the movement settle in your body. 
[Louisa]  
 
This distinction is consistent with Dreyfus’ model of skill acquisition where the 
learner needs to rely on conscious mental representations of the correct movement or 
of the rules for appropriate movement. For Dreyfus (2001), the expert passes through 
this stage into a state where movement emerges intuitively rather than requiring 
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mental processing. At points when problems emerge, the expert does however, revert 
to thinking things through at the representational level, inkeeping with Louisa’s 
description of an interruption to the state of ‘being in your body’ when something 
goes wrong or correction to a movement is required: 
 
… when you’re trying to be in your body but your brain’s going “what am 
I going to do? What am I going to do? How am I going to fix this?”- so I 
mean that’s different – that’s OK to be out of your body at that point 
because you’re trying to deal with stuff. [Louisa] 
 
In the terms of Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger, on whom Dreyfus draws, the 
transcendent or absorbed phase of expert movement is interrupted when the task-
focus can no longer be sustained because of a problem with our surroundings or 
equipment – a change, for example, to a costume, a floor space, a melody, a partner, a 
phrase of movement – and we find ourselves needing to consciously process what is 
going on rather than just being able to act intuitively. Steven, for example, described 
his experience of taking correction to movements that he had already learnt in terms 
of conscious intervention and representational thought:  
 
Sometimes you have to put like a little tag, like a little mental tag where 
you have to go – “OK it’s this, not what you were doing before” and 
that’s kind of how rehearsals work like when you rehearse someone will 
give you a correction and I’ll almost put like a little flag or mental 
checkpoint. [Steven] 
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This was also the stage (learning something new or taking correction) in dance when 
the dancers reported that they made most use of the mirror as they tried to get a sense 
both of how a different pattern of movement looked externally and of the correlating 
internal sensation of the movement. At these times it is therefore appropriate to 
engage with the external perspective on the body so that dancers can further develop 
and refine their internal proprioceptive sense of a movement. This is, however, only a 
temporary situation or exercise, and all the dancers insisted that external 
objectification of the body was an inferior and problematic form of awareness 
compared with feeling the movement ‘in your body’: 
 
Every time I see pictures I get depressed, I hate it – so the image, you 
know, is not the dance – it’s definitely inside. So that is interesting, that 
movement can be inside of my body – you know? – and of course you have 
all the pattern – you know? – my legs, how my legs go, but more 
interesting is the feel for me.  [Marco]  
 
The Gaze of the Audience 
It is, however, worth noting that in so far as the task of contemporary dance is 
expressive and communicative, it is not fully realised if there is no external viewer, no 
recipient of the communication, no audience. Indeed, as noted above, when a dancer 
finds him or herself regarding his or her own bodily movement as a series of shapes, 
the problem the practitioner faces is that they then struggle to engage with the real act 
of dancing, that is, using the movement to communicate at some level with an 
audience. In the following quotation, for example, Louisa compares the false 
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perspective of the mirror with a more correct understanding of how the movement 
looks to the audience: 
 
The mirror does lie: it’s not a good thing to look in the mirror … you can 
see it every now and again to check but I think generally it’s better for me 
not to have a mirror because then I’m feeling the movement and that’s 
always more correct than looking at it because nobody sees the movement 
from here. [Louisa] 
 
To be observed by an audience is thus not, for a dancer, interrupting of transcendence 
in the way that objectification in the mirror image may be. Rather it is the desired 
form of engagement with the movement; it is the means by which the dancer acts on 
the world beyond the self.  
 
Again, Merleau-Ponty’s work offers us a way of making sense of this as, contra 
Sartre (2003), the look of the Other is not necessarily understood in the negative sense 
of being objectifying and alienating under Merleau-Ponty’s framework. The negative 
– objectifying or alienating – effect of the gaze is possible when mutual recognition 
does not occur in our encounter with the Other, leading us to feel that our actions and 
expressions are ‘not taken up and understood, but observed as if they were an 
insect’s’ (Merleau-Ponty 2002, 420). More usually, however, intersubjective 
relations, for Merleau-Ponty (2002, 1964), are communicative and reciprocal
iii
 and 
thus do not, as a matter of course, involve the Other objectifying or ‘capturing’ us 
with the look (Crossley 1993; Levin 1991).  
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Bodies and Tasks in Somatic Practices? 
From the above discussion, we can therefore see some support for Merleau-Ponty’s 
distinction between task-focussed (bodily) transcendence and body-focussed 
immanence: The positive or transcendent experience of dance is interrupted by the 
intrusion of immanence when the image leads the dancer to focus on the shape of the 
body rather than on the ‘task’ of dancing. Moreover, the Dreyfus model is helpful for 
understanding dancers’ progress from consciously processing queues (verbal, musical, 
visual, etc.) from the environment to reaching a stage where the skills are learnt and 
performance becomes intuitive rather than requiring the dancers to reflectively   
process instructions (Steven’s mental checkpoints) or to look in the mirror to check 
alignment. 
 
In place of the traditional dualism of the transcendence of the mind and the 
immanence of the body, then, there is perhaps a temptation to think in terms of a new 
dichotomy between the transcendence of the task-focused body-subject, and the 
negative, restrictive immanence experienced when the physical body itself is the focus 
of attention. My argument in this paper is, however, against this new dichotomisation 
on the grounds that it does not sufficiently account for the body-awareness of the task-
engaged expert dancer. 
 
Indeed the conceptualisation of skilled behaviour in the Dreyfus model as ‘absorbed 
coping’ has elsewhere been noted to be problematic to the extent that it renders the 
expert physical performer ‘mindless’ or ‘zombie-like’ (Eriksen 2010; Breivik 2013). 
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Absorbed coping may be an appropriate description of our everyday experience of 
proficiency in tasks such as walking or driving to work where we may operate ‘on 
auto-pilot’, our intuitive driving or walking skills, knowledge of the route and 
proficiency in dealing with likely obstacles taking over and allowing the mind to 
wander elsewhere. Yet it has been argued that it does not fully characterise the 
experience of highly skilled physical performers such as sportspeople (Larsen 2016; 
Breivik 2007, 2013). Indeed as Breivik (2013) notes, elite athletes are not lacking in 
consciousness and awareness, they are not operating on ‘automatic pilot’ with their 
minds wandering elsewhere, rather they experience a strong subjective feeling of 
presence in the situation and often a sense of heightened awareness.  
 
For Breivik the argument here revolves around a role for consciousness during highly 
skilled performance. Thus he critiques both the information processing paradigm and 
the Dreyfus model of skill acquisition for their failure to account for elite athletes’ 
(heightened) consciousness, but his position leaves open a distinction between task-
focussed attention as useful and body-focussed attention as potentially disruptive of 
flow.  Indeed he aligns himself with recent articulations from sports psychology of the 
performance benefits of task orientation over ego orientation:  
 
One needs to stay focussed in an [sporting] event, but one must focus on the right 
things and not focus too much or too narrow. … Most of the time, it is better that 
the body is in the dark zone [i.e. not the focus of attention], from which the 
bodily parts and movements can come forth to solve the tasks that need to be 
done. (Breivik 2013, 96) 
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While I agree with Breivik and others that we need to account for the expert athlete’s 
awareness in any model of physical skill that can be deemed applicable to 
sportspeople, my interest in this paper is in moving beyond the task-focussed/body-
focussed distinction on the grounds that it is not useful for fully understanding body-
awareness in the experience of dance. In the following section I therefore suggest a 
new concept which sits in-between the traditional transcendence/immanence binary, 
suggesting that rather than the body-focus necessarily producing an experience of 
inhibited or interrupted transcendence, we need to attend to how the body-aware 
dancer experiences what can be thought of as a state of inhabited transcendence. 
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‘Being in your Body’ and ‘Being in the Moment’: Inhabited Transcendence 
 
This section focuses on a detailed examination of two concepts evoked by the 
dancers: that of ‘being in your body’ and that of ‘being in the moment’. These 
concepts help us to see how Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the body as a source of 
transcendence plays out in the embodied practice of dance, but they also emphasise 
the problems associated with thinking in terms of a dichotomy between transcendence 
and immanence, even in the way that Merleau-Ponty does with the distinction 
between task-focussed and body-focussed action. I suggest not only that a clear 
distinction between task-focus and body-focus is often impossible to make for the 
dancer, but also that this distinction does not fully help us understand dancers’ own 
evocations of transcendence.  
 
Body-Awareness: ‘Being in your Body’ 
As noted above, dancers employed a notion of ‘being in your body’ to describe an 
experience of body-subjectivity. Louisa describes ‘being in your body’ in terms of 
feeling comfortably situated or grounded in her body:  
 
‘So that’s kind of to be in your body – how it sits – that I’m comfortably 
there and that I’m correct within my presence there. [Louisa]  
 
This notion of comfort or harmony is further echoed in Marco’s description of how it 
feels to be ‘in harmony with your body’:  
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It’s peaceful and em, it’s peaceful, it’s comfortable, you know, it’s 
pleasurable so it’s like a, mmm, it’s really very difficult to explain, it’s 
just there, it’s in your body and you know it’s good and everything’s 
working, you know?… em, it’s quite hard to explain. [Marco]  
 
Marco’s sense of “it’s good and everything’s working” also echoes Merleau-Ponty’s 
evocation of bodily understanding as an experience of ‘the harmony … between the 
intention and the performance’ (2002, 167). 
 
For Merleau-Ponty, however, the skilled practitioner transcends their bodily 
physicality and situatedness in the world to the point where body and equipment fall 
out of focus and we enter a state of what Dreyfus would call ‘absorbed coping’. Thus 
the comfortable, grounded or settled feeling described by the dancers is referenced in 
the following description from Merleau-Ponty (2002, 168) of the expert organist 
gaining a bodily understanding of a new instrument:  
 
He sits on the seat, works the pedals, pulls out the stops, gets the measure of the 
instrument with his body, incorporates within himself the relevant directions and 
dimensions, settles into the organ as one settles into a house.  
 
Yet the continuation of the description reveals that body and equipment are not the 
focus of musician’s attention, but are reduced to ‘mere’ conduits which facilitate the 
turning of the intention into the music:  
  
During the rehearsal, as during the performance, the stops, pedals and manuals 
are given to him as nothing more than possibilities of achieving certain 
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emotional or musical values, and their positions are simply the places through 
which this value appears in the world. Between the musical essence of the piece 
as it is shown in the score and the notes which actually sound round the organ, so 
direct a relation is established that the organist’s body and his instrument are 
merely the medium of this relationship. (Merleau-Ponty 2002, 168) 
 
The issue here for Merleau-Ponty is to navigate a path between the intellectualist 
paradigm which considers bodily skill to be underpinned by reflective thought and the 
behaviourist paradigm which considers pre-reflective bodily movement reducible to a 
basic stimulus-response mechanism. Through his reconceptualization of the body as 
the body-subject, he is able to establish an argument that allows that the body has 
intentionality, the body can understand, and that the body can be a source of 
transcendence. Without call for reflective thought, the skilled organist can produce 
beautiful music. Bodily movements are no longer physical projections in objective 
space, rather ‘they draw affective vectors, discover emotional sources, and create a 
space of expressiveness’ (Merleau-Ponty 2002, 168). 
  
While this further resonates with Louisa’s description of ‘being in your body’ –  
 
You have to get to a point where you, you’re in your own body and you’re, 
you’re not doing shapes, you’re finding out where it comes from. [Louisa] 
 
– the way in which the body drops out of awareness in Merleau-Ponty’s account of 
bodily-mediated transcendence (and in Dreyfus’ account of absorbed coping) does not 
fully do justice to the dancer’s experience of embodied transcendence as captured in 
the notion of ‘being in your body’. Rather for the dancer, we are dealing not with a 
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body which recedes into the phenomenological dark zone, but with a form of bodily-
mediated transcendence which includes a foregrounded awareness of one’s 
(comfortable) situatedness or groundedness in one’s own body. The experience of 
dance expertise as characterised by a sensation of ‘being in’ the living moving body is 
thus one which includes experiential elements associated with Merleau-Ponty’s 
conceptualisation of task-focused transcendence, but also elements associated a direct 
body-awareness and thus with immanence. 
 
Immediacy: ‘Being in the Moment’ 
In addition to emphasising the importance of ‘being in your body’, Louisa goes on to 
evoke a notion of ‘being in the moment’ that captures a sense of a need for (even) the 
expert dancer to focus on the here and now when performing:  
 
… just to be in that moment – don’t over-do it, don’t think about what’s 
coming next, just do the thing …  instead of trying to think of the whole 
piece, if I live in the moment and it’s, the first thing I have to do is step on 
stage, and if I do that one hundred percent in that moment then it gives it 
full value, but if I step on stage and I’m half way through the piece in my 
head already then I’m not really in it, I’m somewhere else. [Louisa]  
 
This idea of not letting the mind wander ahead to focus on something beyond the here 
and now of bodily movement is also echoed by Marco’s description of how being in 
harmony with your body requires that you do not think about other things but simply 
have a grounded, focussed, in-the-moment awareness of the body: ‘your brain is 
inside [in your body] and you know everything that’s going on’ [Marco]. 
 21 
 
Other dancers similarly described the importance of staying focussed on or immersed 
in the immediate context of the movement. Failure to do this, like the failure to sense 
the movement rather than make shapes as discussed above, somehow distracts or 
detracts from the communicative experience of dance: 
 
I think if a work is made very, very well you can see the essence and then 
the performer becomes immersed in the work and then it works, then you 
get dancers who comment on the work while [it is in progress, which]… 
doesn’t necessarily give the work its chance to communicate. [Ben]  
 
Another dancer further describes his reaction to watching performers who try to go 
beyond an immediate engagement with the movement by layering a dimension of 
self-promotion onto the performance rather than staying true to the immediate context 
of the work:  
 
If they’re not committed in the detail then it’s like you watch somebody 
else because it’s, it’s distracting, but often that’s about them trying to 
show off and trying to put themselves forward rather than be sincere to 
what the movement was. [Daniel] 
 
This notion of immediacy or ‘being in the moment’ was thus related to the idea that 
the real expertise of dance is in the ability to have an immediate and ‘sincere’ 
experience of the ‘essence’ of the movement as an end in itself – a communicative act 
in itself – rather than trying to think ahead or push a supplementary agenda such as 
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‘showing off’. This was related to achievement of a sense of communicative openness 
and honesty in both physical and mental/emotional terms. At the physical level, 
Louisa describes how ‘being in the moment’ allows the dancer to  
 
… open up a void where you’re a bit more free to respond very quickly 
when things don’t go the way it’s supposed to … if I’m in the moment and 
I’m true to that moment then it is what it is so if I went on and I lifted my 
leg and I did a little judder then I go with it, rather than fight it. [Louisa]  
 
This physical openness or responsiveness of the dancer who is in his or her body and 
‘in the moment’ is thus experienced as freedom to act intuitively without feeling self-
conscious or inhibited about the movement which is currently taking shape in the 
body. 
 
In contrast to the typical evocation of transcendence as future-focussed, then, dancers 
reported feelings of freedom and a more successful connection with the 
communicative essence or intention of the movement when they did not think ahead 
of or beyond the here-and-now. Thus their most positive, free and ‘sincere’ 
experiences of dance – their experiences of transcendence in the sense of reaching out 
to the audience – occurred when they stayed resolutely grounded in the present – a 
condition generally associated with immanence – and focussed on fully experiencing 
their moment-by-moment awareness of the moving, dancing body.  
 
The dancer’s understanding of expertise as characterised by an ability to ‘be in the 
moment’ therefore suggests that the typical distinction between transcendence as 
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future-oriented and immanence as a rootedness in the present fails to successfully 
capture the experience of expert body practitioners such as dancers. Conceptualising a 
third in-between state of inhabited transcendence thus once again allows us to account 
for dancers descriptions of their dance expertise as characterised by elements of 
transcendence, such as feelings of freedom, communicative efficacy and self-
determination, and by elements traditionally associated with immanence, such as the 
subjective experience of a groundedness in and attentional focus on the here-and-now. 
 
 
 24 
Concluding Remarks: Inhabited Transcendence 
 
This paper has built on emerging discussions in the philosophy of sport regarding a 
role for conscious awareness during the expert performance of a physical skill 
(Breivik 2007, 2013). In a departure from the dominant information processing 
paradigm for understanding skilled behaviour in sports, I have sought to explore and 
reassert the utility of a phenomenological understanding of physical expertise through 
a return to Merleau-Ponty and an engagement with the more recent development of 
his work in Dreyfus’ phenomenological model of skill acquisition. As mentioned in 
the introduction, the point here has not been to engage further in a discussion of 
consciousness predicated on a particular theory of mind, but rather to explore the 
ways in which the existentialist concepts of transcendence and immanence can open 
up alternative understandings of the phenomenological experience of athletic 
expertise. 
 
Merleau-Ponty radically challenges understandings of transcendence/immanence 
developed in the work of Sartre and de Beauvoir by suggesting that the body is not 
necessarily a source of immanence. Rather, bodily engagement in skilled activity is 
typically characterised by task-focussed motor-intentionality and the body can thus be 
a source of transcendence rather than a limitation upon it. This shift away from mind-
body/subject-object dualism in the work of Merleau-Ponty is particularly helpful in 
accounting for the lived experience of elite performers of embodied physical skills, as 
has been shown above in relation to the case of professional contemporary dancers. 
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Careful attention to the intricacies of the lived embodied experience of physical 
expertise can, however, help us even further refine our philosophical understanding of 
skill (Larsen 2016; Ravn and Hoffding 2017). In attending to the experience of dance 
through an engagement with the accounts of dancers themselves, I have gone beyond 
Merleau-Ponty’s conceptualisation of bodily-transcendence as reliant on having a 
task-focus to explore how even direct focus on the body need not necessarily interrupt 
transcendence. This is because awareness of the immediate physicality of the dance 
and the dancing body does not necessarily mean objectification for the dancer. Rather 
it is the lived experience of immediate bodily presence to the world that characterises 
their expressive and communicative action on the world, their experience of 
transcendence.  
 
This is not to say that the dancer does not have an awareness of their overall task, but 
that it is a fully present and somatically grounded awareness – an inhabited awareness 
– rather than one which pushes the subjective experience of bodily presence into the 
phenomenological dark zone. Likewise, others who perform physical skills in the 
service of the sporting task such as winning a race may have what Breivik (2013) 
refers to as a heightened subjective experience of presence. This does not mean they 
are not focussed on, for example, scoring a goal to win the match. The experience of 
dancers presented in this paper, however, suggests that it is problematic to theorise 
physical expertise and the completion of physical tasks at the elite level in such a way 
that denies that such an experience may be characterised by both an awareness of 
one’s (embodied) ability to act on the world and an awareness of one’s corporeal 
presence in the moment. As I have demonstrated above, the clear distinction between 
the body as site of transcendence or immanence in relation to task-focus or body-
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focus does not hold in the case of professional contemporary dancers, and I would 
suggest that this is another unnecessary dualism that we need to leave behind to fully 
understand the body-subjectivity of body experts performing physical skills at an elite 
level. 
 
In place of this dichotomy, I have argued that a focus on how the dancers’ concepts of 
‘being in your body’ and ‘being in the moment’ potentially opens up a space in-
between traditional divisions between subject and object, and transcendence and 
immanence. Captured in these experiential categories is the description of a state of 
being-in-the-world which is simultaneously characterised by on the one hand the 
physical and temporal groundedness and immediacy of immanence and, on the other 
hand the freedom, self-determination and communicative efficacy of transcendence: a 
mode of being I have called ‘inhabited transcendence’.  
 
Each form of body expertise of course has its own experiential characteristics, and the 
body awareness of elite contemporary dancers may well be shaped by their practice as 
performing artists in ways which differ from the body awareness of competitive sports 
dancers or other sportspeople. My contention is, however, that in attending to the 
lived experiences of particular body experts (in this case contemporary dancers) we 
are able to open up conversations about what is missing from our broader 
understanding of skill and expertise in elite body practitioners in a way that has 
resonance for the philosophy of sport more generally. 
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i
 The data was collected through in-depth qualitative interviews that I conducted myself with a total of 
16 professional dancers based at two separate repertory companies in the United Kingdom. Eight of the 
participants were white and eight were from minority ethnic backgrounds; eight were male and eight 
female; and their ages ranged from approximately 18 to 45. For more information on the research 
methods, see Purser 2017b. 
ii
 The feeling described by Young (1998) is inhibition regarding full bodily engagement in physical 
activities (she uses the example of the throwing action) because of a sense of an uncomfortable 
awareness of how one’s body may look to others. For Young, this stems from the ways in which young 
girls, socialised in patriarchal society, are taught to understand their bodies as on display for and open 
to the judgement of others. [For more on how these gender differences regarding the inhibiting effects 
of self-awareness may relate to highly competent professional  dancers, see Purser 2017a] 
iii
 I have noted elsewhere (Purser 2011) that dancers also distinguish between the negative (objectifying 
and alienating) experience of the use of the mirror or other external images to learn a choreography, 
and the positive experience of intersubjective ‘mirroring’ in situations where they pick up or respond to 
movements from another person. This again, speaks to the importance of the communicative or 
reciprocal nature of intersubjective relations. 
